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provision reserving the right of Sea-Land 
to use another vessel "to perform all or 
part of the carriage without giving notice 
to the shipper. It also contained a provi­
sion limiting liability to $500.00 per con­
tainer for damage occurring during car­
riage unless the shipper declared a higher 
value on the face of the bill. Yang Ma­
chine had not declared a higher value. 
Yang Machine brought suit against Sea­
Land in district court, bringing a summary 
judgment motion for damages in the 
amount of $241,700. Sea-Land cross-mo­
tioned for summary judgment, to limit its 
liability to $1,000.00 based on the con­
tract and 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 304(5). 
The lower court granted Yang Machine's 
motion, finding Sea-Land had unreason­
ably deviated by its restowage of cargo 
aboard the Sea/and Patriot. On appeal, 
the ninth circuit reversed, holding that 
Sea-Land had not unreasonably deviated 
from the contract and Yang Machine had 
failed to exercise its option to declare 
value beyond the $500 limitation. The ap­
peals court remanded, limiting Sea-Land's 
liability. 
The question before the appeals court 
was whether Sea-Land's transfer of Yang 
Machine's cargo from the Merchant 
Prince to the Sea/and Patriot constituted 
an unreasonable deviation, ousting Sea­
Land from the $500 package limitation of 
46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5). 
Under COGSA, carrier liability for dam­
age to cargo is limited to $500 per pack­
age. This limitation does not exist if either 
an unreasonable deviation from the terms 
of the bill of lading occurs, or if the ship­
per has not been afforded the opportunity 
to declare a value exceeding the $500 
package limit. 
The ninth circuit first discussed the dis­
trict court's assertion that Sea-Land unrea­
sonably deviated because the bill of lading 
did not contain a transshipment clause, 
which allows a carrier to transfer cargo 
from one vessel to another during car­
riage. The district court opined that the 
transfer from one ship to another violated 
the contract. The ninth circuit found that 
Clause 3 in the bill of lading gave Sea­
Land the right to use another vessel to 
complete all or part of the voyage and pro­
vided sufficient notice to Yang Machine 
of that possibility. Clause 3 in Sea-Land's 
bill, although not containing the word 
"transshipment," contained language 
found in bills of lading of other major car-
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riers which the district court agreed 
contained sufficient notice of potential 
transshipment. Using a substitute ves­
sel for completion of the voyage was. 
the appeals court held, a transshipment 
and not a deviation from the contract of 
carriage. 
Yang Machine contended that Clause 
3 in Sea-Land's bill of lading was a 
"liberty clause.'' A liberty clause is a 
clause which may be unenforceable if it 
gives a carrier unreasonable freedom to 
alter aspects of carriage. In evaluating 
the content of Clause 3, the ninth circu� 
determined that the clause contained 
two separate and distinct paragraphs. 
Although the first paragraph contained 
language found in a typical liberty 
clause, the second, containing language 
permitting Sea-Land to use a substitute 
vessel for all or part of the carriage, was 
enforc'eable, since it did not contain 
typical liberty clause language. 
The limitation under COGSA would 
not have been available, the court also 
stated, if the shipper had not been given 
"fair opportunity" to declare a value 
higher than $500. The court was un­
convinced by Yang Machine's claim 
that the limitation ofliability provisions 
noted on the bill prevented it from 
declaring actual value, since the shipper 
had never inquired into making a decla­
ration of higher value. Yang Machine's 
contention regarding lack of opportu­
nity was further weakened by the fact 
that the company had previously 
shipped via Sea-Land on many occa­
sions and never contested the limitation 
clause in the bill nor attempted to de­
clare higher value. The shipper's fail­
ure to claim higher value was probably 
prompted, the court observed, by an 
economic decision, since it would have 
had to pay higher fees to insure the 
cargo beyond the express limitation. 
This rationale was supported by the fact 
that Yang Machine separately insured 
the cargo, receiving payment from its 
insurer after the cargo was damaged. 
Harry C. Demiris, Jr. 
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Seaman's Damages 
N O  P UNITIVE DAM AG ES FOR 
FAIL URE TO P AY 
M AIN TEN AN CE & CURE TO 
JON ES ACT SEAM AN 
Ni nth ci rcui t award s reasonable at­
torney's fees- but not p uni ti ve d am­
ages- on clai m for wi llful and p ersi s­
tent fai lure of emp loyer to ei ther i n­
vesti gate mai ntenance and cure clai m 
or to p ay mai ntenance. 
(Glynn v. Roy AI Boat Management 
Corp. , CA9, 57 F.3d 1495, 6121195) 
Christopher Glynn (Glynn) was hired 
as a crew member in late January 1 992 
by Daniel 1. Shawhan (Shawhan), cap­
tain and master of the FN No Problem, 
a boat owned by Roy AI Boat Manage­
ment Corporation (Roy AI). Glynn 
signed a written agreement which stated 
terms of his employment, such as the 
compensation arrangement, grounds for 
termination, etc. While the No Problem 
was docked in Honolulu, Hawaii, Glynn 
was fired for coming late to work. 
Glynn brought suit under the Jones Act 
and general maritime law, alleging he 
had sustained injuries while he was a 
crew member of the No Problem. The 
jury returned verdicts favoring Glynn 
on his claims for unseaworthiness, neg­
ligence and maintenance against both 
Roy AI and Shawhan, finding both to be 
Jones Act employers. (The court had 
left the issue of whether or not Shawhan 
was an employer to the jury.) The jury 
also awarded punitive damages after de­
termining defendants had acted 
"arbitrarily, willfully, and with bad 
faith" in neglecting to provide mainte­
nance and cure. The district judge 
granted judgment n.o.v. in favor of de­
fendants on the issue of punitive dam­
ages on the basis that such damages 
were unavailable as a matter of law, but 
awarded attorney's fees on the claim for 
maintenance and cure. The court denied 
Glynn prejudgment interest since he had 
failed to request that the jury consider 
the question. Plaintiff and defendants 
appealed to the ninth circuit. 
The main issues in the case involved 
determination of who was Glynn's true 
Jones Act employer; whether attorney's 
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fees were available under a claim for 
maintenance and cure; and whether the 
Supreme Court's Miles decision and 
ninth circuit precedent precluded punitive 
damages on a general maritime action. 
The ninth circuit noted that in order for 
Glynn to recover under the Jones Act he 
had to show a defendant was his em­
ployer. Cosmopolitan Shopping Co. v. 
McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,787 n.6 ( 1949). 
The district court had found as a matter of 
Jaw that an employer/employee relation­
ship existed between Glynn and Roy AI. 
The ninth circuit rejected Roy Al's argu­
ment that the jury could have found 
Glynn to be a joint venturer or indepen­
dent contractor on the basis of the com­
pensation arrangement, which was based 
on a receipt of a percentage of profits. 
The appellate court concluded that no rea­
sonable jury could have found factually 
that Glynn was anything other than an 
employee, considering several factors 
such as payment, direction, supervision 
and source of power to hire and fire. 
Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 
F.2d 23 1 , 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 
u.s. 9 1 9  ( 1 99 1 ). 
The appeals court also concluded that 
the district court had erred in submitting 
defendant Shawhan's employer status as 
a j ury question. The court stated that, 
since there could only be one employer 
for the purposes of the Jones Act and that 
it had already been determined that Roy 
AI was Glynn's  employer, the jury should 
not have been permitted to consider the 
question of whether or not Shawhan was 
also Glynn's employer. 
With respect to the issue of whether 
Glynn was entitled to attorney's fees, the 
ninth circuit noted that it was well estab­
lished, since Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 
U.S. 527 ( 1962), that an injured seaman 
could recover attorney's fees where de­
fendant had acted willfully and persis­
tently in failing to pay maintenance and 
cure. The court treated the issue as aban­
doned by defendant Roy AI, since it did 
not seriously contest the issue of its 
"willful and persistent" failure to either 
investigate Glynn's claim or pay mainte­
nance. 
The appeals court, instead, focussed on 
Glynn's assertion that the lower court had 
not properly set the level of fees on his 
claim. The court determined that the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
fixing the amount of fees awarded and 
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that the amount awarded was reason­
able, affirming the result. The ninth 
circuit observed with approval that the 
district court, in fixing the fees, had 
used factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen 
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
95 1 ( 1 976), such as time and labor re­
quired, novelty and difficulty of the 
question involved, skill necessary to 
pursue the claim, preclusion of other 
employment, etc. 
The ninth circuit focussed in the criti­
cal part of its opinion on the issue of 
whether the district court had erred in 
finding that Glynn was not entitled to 
punitive damages on the maintenance 
and cure claim. The court, in its analy­
sis, relied on Miles v. Apex Marine 
Corp. , 498 U.S. 1 9  ( 1 990), concluding 
that punitive damages are not recover­
able for defendant's willful, 'arbitrary 
and persistent failure to pay mainte­
nance and cure. Glynn v. Roy At Boat 
Management Corp. , 57 F.3d 1495, 
1 505. The court extended the Miles ra­
tionale l imiting nonpecuniary recovery 
to general maritime causes of action on 
the theory that such recovery was not 
provided for in the "uniform plan of 
maritime tort law Congress created." 
The appeals court rejected Glynn's ar­
gument that it should not abandon the 
ninth circuit's recognition of punitive 
damages for failure to pay maintenance 
and cure under the pre-Miles precedent 
of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914  
( 1987). The court pointed out that the 
language in Evich supporting plain­
tiffs position was dictum. The ninth 
circuit expressly refused to follow the 
fifth circuit' s opinion in Guevara v. 
Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 
1 279 (5th Cir. 1 994), where the court 
upheld a punitive damage award for 
failure to pay maintenance and cure. 
The ninth circuit noted that decisions 
upholding punitive damages relied 
"directly or indirectly" on the Vaughan 
case. The Supreme Court in that case 
had acknowledged for the first time 
that damages for failure to give mainte­
nance and cure may include "necessary 
expenses, including attorney's fees, 
when the failure to pay maintenance is 
willful and persistent." Glynn, 57 F.3d 
at 1 504. The ninth circuit concluded 
that there is no reason why the plaintiff 
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should be awarded punitive damages in 
addition to attorney's  fees since attor­
ney's fees alone were a powerful incen­
tive deterring employers from willfully 
and arbitrarily refusing to pay mainte­
nance and cure. 
As to other issues raised, the court 
ruled that Glynn's failure to submit the 
question of prejudgment interest to the 
jury served as a waiver on his prejudg­
ment entitlement and that the district 
court had not erred in finding that a 
magistrate could not order payment of 
maintenance and cure as a condition for 
lifting a default against defendants. The 
lower court had found that there was a 
disputed issue of fact as to whether any 
injury had befallen Glynn aboard the 
No Problem, which required a determi­
nation before he could prevail and, 
therefore, such an action by the magis­
trate would have been premature. 
Alexia I. Panteris 
Class of 1 996 
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COGSA Carriers 
CH ARTERER CAN BIND VESSEL 
OWNER DESP ITE CH ARTER­
P ARTY INDEM NITY CL AUSE BY 
SIG NING "FOR TH E M ASTER" 
Charter party authorizing charterer 
to sign for master could bind vessel 
owner as COG SA carrier even 
though charter party ex pressly 
incl ud ed ind emnification provision; 
shippers fail ed to meet fifth circuit 
privity stand ard or make prima facie 
bailment cl aim against owner. 
(Thyssen Steel Company v. MIV Kava 
Yerakas, CA5, 50 F.3d 1349, 4127195) 
Thyssen Steel Company (Thyssen) 
entered into a contract with Europe­
Overseas Steamship Lines (Eurolines) 
to carry steel from Europe to Texas 
aboard the ship MN Kava Yerakas, 
which had been time chartered to 
Eurolines by its owner, Dodekaton 
Corporation (Dodekaton). Pursuant to 
loading the cargo of steel pipe, bills of 
lading were issued and signed by the 
Eurolines agent "for the master." 
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